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SPECIAL VERDICTS

curbing and forceful nature and resort to more enlightenment
of the individual. If we cannot prove the superiority of our
government over that for which the radical strives, except by
force, we are admitting a weakness of our government. Let us
not wait until this radicalism becomes a severe menace. To
spread knowledge of our traditions, ideals and customs would
appear to be the duty of every true American. Anyone can
hurl vituperations and epithets, everyone can laud an effect, but
it takes a real big, broad, high-minded American to eliminate
the cause which underlies the effect. What are you doing?
Where do you stand?
GILBERT ]i. BRACH, Editor.

SPECIAL VERDICTS.
HON. THOMAS

H. RYAN,

Formerly Judge of the Municipal Court of Outagamie County

It is the settled rule of law in this State, that "it is reversible
error for the trial Court by instruction to the jury to inform
the jury expressly or by necessary implication of the effect of an
answer or answers to a question or questions of a special verdict
upon the ultimate right of either party litigant to recover, or upon
the ultimate liability of either party litigant." Banderob vs. Wis.
Cent. R. Co., 133 Wis. 249.
The purpose of this article is to inquire into the soundness of
this rule.
It will be admitted that the purpose of the trial of a case is to
ascertain the truth, to the end that justice may prevail. Is the
information given by the court to the jury of the effect of an
answer or answers to a question or questions of a special verdict,
upon the ultimate right of either party litigant to recover, inimical
to justice? If it is, then it is due either to the fact that such information is bad in itself, or to the fact that the jury is less honest
than the court. If such knowledge is bad in itself, it follows that
the source of the knowledge is immaterial. Whether the jury
possessed the knowledge before they were impaneled, or acquired
it during trial from an intelligent juror, or from the attorneys, or
from the court, will make no difference in the result. In other
words, the answers of the jury to the questions will not be different because of the source of their information. If the knowl69
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edge of the effect of their answers upon the ultimate liability of
either party litigant to recover is repugnant to justice, then the
desideratum is a jury so ignorant that they cannot comprehend
the effect of their answers upon the final result.
Dismissing from consideration the possibility of getting, in this
day and age, such a jury, the aim, at least, should be to procure
such a jury if possible. It follows, that on the voire dire, the
jury should be interrogated both as to their education and judgment, as well as to their prejudices and bias. Only the ignorant
and unprejudiced should be permitted to serve.
Again, if knowledge of the effect of their answers upon the
right of either party litigant to recover is intrinsically bad, why
is not such knowledge on the part of the judge equally bad in a
case tried by the court? The court, trying a case involving questions of fact, uses the same processes of reasoning and deduction
that a layman does. So far as is generally known, the Lord has
not endowed him with additional faculties.
Supporters of this theory reply: "It has often been demonstrated in the trial of causes, that the non-expert juryman is
mote liable than the experienced lawyer or judge to be led away
from the material issues of fact involved by some collateral circumstance of little or no significance, or by sympathy, bias, or
prejudice." Ryan v. Rockford Insurance Co., 77 Wis. 6iI. This
brings us to the consideration of the second phase of the inquiry,
namely: Is the jury less honest than the court?
The court's saying that the non-expert juryman is more liable
than the judge to be led away from the material issues by sympathy, bias, or prejudice, smacks of one of the parties acting as
judge in his own case, and has no greater force than the jury's
saying that the court is more liable than the jury to be influenced
by sympathy, prejudice or bias. Neither the court nor the jury
is competent or authorized to determine who is the more susceptible, and the declaration of either to be binding, requires legislative enactment. No honest judge will contend that he is without
sympathies, prejudices, or biases. Like the Pharisee of old, he
may flatter himself that he is not like the layman and is able to
rise above them; but if "flattery corrupts both the receiver and
the giver," as Edmund Burke says, he is doubly corrupted and no
one is deceived. His sympathies, prejudices, and biases may not
be the same as the non-expert juryman's, but he possesses them
just the same. The non-expert juryman may be prejudiced
70
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against corporations and the court may be prejudiced in their
favor, or the reverse may be true. There is a way provided for
ascertaining the jury's predilections, but not the court's. If the
non-expert juryman, on his voire dire, swears that he is not so
prejudiced, it is with poor taste and without legal authority, as
a reference to the constitution and statutes will disclose, for the
court to discount his statement for any purpose 6f the trial. What
is really meant is that the jury are not as honest as the court,
and for that reason, the court is justified in putting blinders
on the jury for fear they might see what is going on on the side.
By the court, deprived of their full vision on the one hand and
denied the light necessary to visualize the end of their labors on
the other hand, the jury is expected to return a consistent verdict. If they do not, the defendant winks the eye nearest his
"experienced lawyer," while Justice weeps and walks out of her
own temple.
With the statement: "The non-expert juryman is more liable
than the experienced lawyer or judge to be led away from the
material issues of fact involved by some collateral circumstance
of little or no significance," I take no issue. The non-expert
juryman is more liable to be led away from the material issues
of fact by collateral circumstances of little or no signifiance,
but it is not because of his syrhpathy, prejudice, or bias, but
because of his ignorance. If he possessed.the knowledge of the
experienced lawyer or judge he would be no different than either,
and the remedy is not to keep information from him, but to enlighten him to the fullest extent possible; not to curtail his vision,
but to extend it; not to make him fearful to take a step, but to
be a lamp to his feet-in a word, to treat him as a co-laborer
in the temple of justice. This cannot be done by assuming him
to be an inferior and unworthy of full confidence. Nor can it
be done by commenting on the facts or by couching information
in language intended to conceal from the jury the effect of their
answers upon the final result. It is because the jury are nonexpert and not because they are more prone than the court to
sympathy, prejudice, or bias that the issues are split up into
simple questions.
What is more, if knowledge of the effect of the jury's answers
upon the final result is repugnant to justice, how can the instruction to the jury on a general verdict, as now given, be justified?
In the case of a general verdict it is held not only to be proper,
71
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but necessary to charge, that "the plaintiff cannot recover unless
the defendant has been guilty of negligence (defining it) which
was the proximate cause (defining it) of the injury to the
plaintiff; nor unless the plaintiff has been free from contributory
negligence." Such a charge does expressly inform the jury how
to decide in case they wish their sympathy, prejudice, or bias
to determine their judgment. Banderob vs. Wis. Cent. R. Co.,
133 Wis. 249.

Who has decided that the layman is more liable than the experienced lawyer or judge to be influenced by his sympathy, prejudice, or bias? This is a government of the people. Have the
people so decided? If so, let someone tell when and where. Did
their representatives? Examine the statutes pertaining to special
verdicts. (Statutes 1856, chapter 120, section 171, R. S.; 1858,
chapter 132, section II; 1874, chapter 194, section I; 1875, chapter 21; 1878, section 2858; 1899, chapter 2858; 1898, section
2858; 1903, chapter 390, section I; supplement 19o6, section 2858;
1907, chapter 118; 1917, chapter 128, section 2858.)

None of these enactmentg are subject to that interpretation.
In the case of Ryan vs. The Rockford Insurance Company, 77
Wis. 611, which Justice Timlin, in the case of Banderob vs. Wis.
Cent. R. Co., 133 Wis. 249, designates "the earliest case," the
court correctly says: "The purpose of submitting particular controverted questions of fact is to secure a direct answer free from
any bias or prejudice in favor or against either party. It is a wise
provision in certain cases when properly administered." Then
the court proceeds to say, that "it has often been demonstrated in
the trial of causes that the non-expert juryman is more liable
than the experienced lawyer or judge to be led away from the
material issues of fact involved by some collateral circumstance
of little or no significance, or by sympathy, bias, or prejudice,"
without disclosing who determined the same, or who passed upon
the success of the demonstration, or who authorized and empowered the court to read into the special verdict statute a statement that the sympathies, prejudices, and biases of the layman are
more inimical to justice than the court's, or that the jury are less
honest than the court.
Why one possessing a knowledge of the technicalities of the
law, is held to be more free from prejudices, sympathies, or
biases or to be more honest than one educated in any other profession or calling, in the light of the statement of Chief Justice
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SPECIAL VERDICTS

Winslow, that "we have enough and to spare of lawyers who
regard the practice of law merely as a business and who are
striving simply to circumvent the law in the interest of the
client," is not explained. Neither is it explained how the appointment by the Governor, or the election by the people, to the bench,
of the self-seeking aspirant for judicial honors, is able to miraculously change over night one, who in practice strove "to circumvent the law in the interest of the client" into such a paragon of
perfection, that he would burst with pent up virtue if he did not,
like a frog on his pedestal in the swamp, belch forth that sublime
American principle, that the layman, regardless of his ability,
education, or moral training, is inore liable than the "experienced
lawyer or judge" to do injustice to his fellow man. Nor is it
explained why Justice Lyon, in the case of Haley vs. Jump River
L. Co., 81 Wis., 412, was warranted in saying, that "the trial
court should see to it that the right to a special verdict is not used
to entrap the jury into error, as it sometimes is by defendants in
desperate or doubtful cases." The development of one faculty
does not necessarily imply the development of any other, but
often the weakening of the others. Honesty is inherent in man
and is strengthened and developed by use and by moral training,
not by the development of the other faculties.
There is not a lawyer in the state whose trial work has extended over a number of years who cannot recount numbers of
instances where justice has miscarried because of the judicial
emasculation of the special verdict statute. I desire to give one
which is typical of hundreds. A bank in a certain city in this
state, in the course of its construction of a new building, placed
its building materials on the sidewalk so as to completely obstruct
passage and so high that a pedestrian could not see over it. Just
as the plaintiff, an old man, stepped off the walk into the street to
go around the obstruction, he was struck by an approaching automobile, breaking his leg and otherwise severely injuring him.
The usual questions were submitted and the usual charge given.
In a short time the jury agreed on their verdict, finding the defendant guilty of negligence and the plaintiff free from contributory negligence, and awarding plaintiff substantial damages. Just
as they were about to return their verdict into court, one of the
jurors suggested that inasmuch as finding the defendant guilty of
negligence might injure the standing of the defendant in the
community and thus hurt his business, they ought to apportion
73
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the negligence. Thereupon they changed the answer to the question of contributory negligence, finding the plaintiff guilty thereof.
While it is true it was sympathy that determined that action, it is
also true that had the jury been informed that if they found the
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, no liability would attach
to the defendant, they would not have changed their answer and
plaintiff would have recovered. Denied by the court of what he
was entitled to, is it any wonder that the plaintiff, his friends and
many persons familiar with the facts now feel that the function
of the court is to safeguard property regardless of the rights of
the individual, especially if he be poor? Is it any wonder that
many of the toilers of our nation are suspicious of our courts
and are directing their efforts to the securing of soviet government for their protection?
The special verdict statute, as enacted by the legislature, was
not intended to control either the sympathies, prejudices, or biases
of the jury or of the court. Neither was it enacted to abridge,
in a trial where special questions are submitted, the prerogatives
exercised by the jury in a trial of a case on general verdict. It
was enacted for the sole purpose of splitting up the issues into
simple questions so as to simplify the work of the jury.
Judicial interpretation and construction are responsible for the
present rule of law and its concomitant miscarriages of justice.
Inasmuch as our courts persist in adhering to said rule, legislative enactment is necessary to effect a change.

